











WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT 
CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 
 
Nora Traum 
Indiana University  
 
Shu-Chun Yang 
Congressional Budget Office 
 
May 1, 2010 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1611196. 
 
The Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research resides in the Department of Economics 
at Indiana University Bloomington.  CAEPR can be found on the Internet at: 
http://www.indiana.edu/~caepr. CAEPR can be reached via email at caepr@indiana.edu or 
via phone at 812-855-4050. 
 
©2008 by NAME. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may 
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to 
the source. WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT?
NORA TRAUM AND SHU-CHUN S. YANG
Abstract. We examine when government debt crowds out investment for the U.S. econ-
omy using an estimated New Keynesian model with a detailed ﬁscal speciﬁcation. The
estimation accounts for the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policies. Whether pri-
vate investment is crowded in or out in the short term depends on the ﬁscal or monetary
shock that triggers a debt expansion: higher debt can crowd in investment despite a higher
real interest rate for a reduction in capital tax rates or an increase in productive government
investment. Contrary to the conventional view of crowding out, no systematic relationship
among debt, the real interest rate, and investment exists. This result oﬀers an explanation
as to why empirical studies that have focused on the reduced-form relationship between
interest rates and debt are often inconclusive. At longer horizons, distortionary ﬁnancing is
important for the negative investment response to a debt expansion.
Keywords: Crowding Out; Distortionary Debt Financing; Fiscal and Monetary Policy In-
teractions; Bayesian Estimation
JEL Codes: C11; E63; H63
The past decade in the United States has been a period of tremendous ﬁscal activity:
expenditures on the war on terrorism, two major tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, ﬁscal stimulus
packages in 2008 and 2009, and the ﬁnancial rescue programs. These activities have occurred
against a backdrop of demographic trends that suggest accelerated spending increases in fu-
ture medical programs and Social Security. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009) projects
that federal debt in 2080 will reach 283 percent and 716 percent, respectively, of GDP under
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the extended current-law scenario and an alternative ﬁscal scenario, suggesting an unsustain-
able path for U.S. ﬁscal policy.
1 The active use of ﬁscal policy has raised concern about debt
accumulation and rekindled a classic economic debate: Will government debt accumulation
lead to declines in (i.e. crowd out) private investment?
This paper estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model using
Bayesian methods to evaluate the extent of crowding out by government debt for the U.S.
economy. Several recent papers employ Bayesian techniques to understand the economic
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Most of them, however, have not modeled in detail the interactions
between monetary and ﬁscal policies or the ﬁscal adjustments induced by government debt
accumulation [Coenen and Straub (2005), Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009), Lopez-Salido
and Rabanal (2006), and Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010)]. In addition, previous DSGE
models estimated to study ﬁscal and monetary interactions have not accounted for several
ﬁscal instruments, such as distortionary taxes [for example, Leeper and Sims (1994) and Kim
(2000)]. We incorporate a detailed ﬁscal speciﬁcation into a standard New Keynesian model
often used for monetary policy analysis. The rich dynamics between monetary and ﬁscal
policy in the model help explain the investment response to government debt accumulation.
Following World War II, many economists were concerned about the impact of government
debt [for example, Domar (1944), Leland (1944), Wallich (1946), and the references therein].
Since then, a conventional view has emerged, suggesting that government borrowing is ex-
pansionary in the short run but contractionary in the long run.
2 Keynesian economic theory
argues that when prices and wages are sticky, higher debt caused by deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cuts
or spending increases adds to aggregate demand, leading income and output to increase. The
deﬁcits, however, reduce public saving. If private saving and capital inﬂows do not increase
enough to fully oﬀset government borrowing, interest rates rise over time. Consequently,
investment is crowded out, and capital and output eventually decline, negating the short
run expansionary beneﬁts.
Building on this theoretical view, many empirical studies have estimated the reduced-form
relationship between government debt (or deﬁcits) and interest rates at various horizons. A
positive estimated relationship between the two variables is viewed as evidence of crowding
out. Surveys of the literature generally conclude a lack of consensus among the ﬁndings.
3
This paper uses an estimated DSGE model to show that even when government debt ex-
pansions reduce investment, no systematic reduced-form relationship between debt and real
interest rates exists. The result explains why empirical studies focusing on the relationship
between interest rates and debt are often inconclusive about the extent of crowding out by
government debt.
1The alternative ﬁscal scenario incorporates some policy changes that regularly have been made in the past
and are widely expected to occur.
2See Bernheim (1989) and Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) for a detailed discussion.
3See Barth, Iden, and Russek (1984), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), Gale and Orszag (2003), and Engen and
Hubbard (2005). Laubach (2009) ﬁnds a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between debt or deﬁcits and
interest rates when long-horizon forward rates and projected federal deﬁcits are used. Engen and Hubbard
(2005) also obtain similar results using the same measures for the two variables; however, they ﬁnd that
when the dependent variable is the change in the forward rate rather than the level, the positive coeﬃcient
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We add ﬁscal details to a standard New Keynesian model that has been shown to ﬁt data
well [Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2007)].
Most ﬁscal instruments can respond to government indebtedness, as in Leeper, Plante, and
Traum (2010). Income tax rates adjust automatically to the state of the economy, as does the
income tax policy in practice. Instead of assuming all government spending is wasteful, we
distinguish between government consumption and productive government investment. Since
the extent to which consumers are myopic has received much attention in the debate of ﬁscal
policy eﬀects, we include non-savers (also known as liquidity-constrained or rule-of-thumb
agents) as well as savers (forward-looking agents with rational expectations), following Gali,
Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009).
4
Aside from the ﬁscal emphasis, monetary policy is also accounted for. Historical decompo-
sitions show that both monetary and ﬁscal policy shocks are important for debt movements.
Further, the path of investment following expansionary ﬁscal shocks varies qualitatively
with various monetary policy parameter combinations. For example, the hawkishness of the
monetary authority aﬀects the path of real interest rates, which in turn aﬀect investment
decisions. A priori, the model does not impose restrictions on whether government debt
crowds out or in investment and on how government debt aﬀects the economy. By estimat-
ing most structural and policy parameters in the model, we assess the importance of ﬁscal
and monetary policy as well as other factors for determining the eﬀects of government debt.
Several factors drive the investment response to rising government debt: the source of pol-
icy changes that give rise to debt growth, the response of monetary policy, and distortionary
debt ﬁnancing. In the short run, the eﬀect of government debt is mainly determined by the
type of ﬁscal or monetary policy shock that triggers a debt expansion. Higher government
debt can crowd in investment despite a higher real interest rate if the debt is generated
by a reduction in capital tax rates or by an increase in productive government investment,
because both raise the net return to capital. This result is consistent with those from cal-
ibrated models [Ludvigson (1996) and Leeper and Yang (2008), and Freedman, Kumhof,
Laxton, Muir, and Mursala (2009)]. Over a longer horizon, distortionary ﬁnancing plays an
important role in the negative investment response following a debt expansion. We ﬁnd that
most ﬁscal instruments respond to debt systematically under rather diﬀuse priors: when the
debt-to-output ratio rises, the government reduces its purchases and transfers and increases
income taxes to stabilize debt. Among the various instruments used for ﬁscal adjustments,
raising income taxes, in particular the capital tax rate, has a strong negative impact on
investment, as found by Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) and Uhlig (2010) in neoclassical
growth models.
Monetary policy—particularly the central bank’s responsiveness to output—matters sys-
tematically for the path of investment. The more aggressively the central bank responds to
output ﬂuctuations following a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced ﬁscal intervention, the smaller the increase
or the larger the decline in investment, depending on which ﬁscal instrument triggers the
debt expansion. In the case of a positive government investment shock, a suﬃciently large
response in the nominal interest rate can reverse the crowding-in eﬀect on investment in the
short run.
4The debate concerns whether government debt is perceived as net wealth [Modigliani (1961), Barro (1974),
Blanchard (1985), and Smetters (1999)]. If so, people behave myopically as non-savers in our model.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 4
Finally, we isolate historical ﬁscal innovations, which allow us to evaluate the eﬀects of
individual ﬁscal policy episodes. We focus on the tax increases in 1990s and the deﬁcit-
ﬁnanced tax cuts during the recession in 2001 and 2002. Counterfactual exercises ﬁnd that
when the capital and labor tax innovations from 1993Q1 to 1997Q2 are turned oﬀ, the real
value of federal debt in 1997Q2 is 11 percent higher and investment is 2 percent higher
than their historical values, suggesting that the tax adjustments had a negative eﬀect on
investment. In addition, although the 2001 and 2002 tax cuts were expansionary, monetary
policy played a larger role in counteracting the 2001 recession.
1. The Estimated Model
The model is a conventional New Keynesian model based on Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), and
Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009). We include two types of households: savers, who are
forward-looking with access to complete asset and capital markets, and non-savers, who do
not have access to ﬁnancial or capital markets and consume all of their disposable income
each period. Because non-savers have a higher marginal propensity to consume than savers,
their presence allows stronger short-run demand eﬀects following expansionary ﬁscal policy
actions than in models with only savers. Non-savers also break Ricardian equivalence, as
lump-sum transfers are distortionary.
Other features of the model are standard in the New Keynesian literature. We incorporate
two real rigidities—variable capital utilization and investment adjustment costs—and two
nominal rigidities for prices and wages, both adjusting by a Calvo (1983) mechanism with
partial indexation to past inﬂation.
5 The equilibrium system of the model is log-linearized
and solved by Sims’s (2001) algorithm.
6. Unless otherwise noted, all exogenous disturbances
are assumed to follow AR(1) processes.
1.1. Households. The economy is populated by a continuum of households on the interval
[0,1], of which a fraction   are non-savers and a fraction (1− ) are savers. The superscript
S indicates a variable associated with savers and N with non-savers.


















where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, γ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and κ ≥ 0 is the labor preference parameter. ub
t is a shock to general
preferences. The economy has a continuum of diﬀerentiated labor inputs indexed by l ∈ [0,1].
We assume that each household supplies all diﬀerentiated labor inputs to eliminate labor
income discrepancies from individual households supplying diﬀerentiated labor services, as
in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). The total hours supplied by household j satisﬁes the
5Habit formation, commonly included in DSGE models, is dropped from the speciﬁcation. Because non-saver
households react to most of the ﬁscal shocks diﬀerently than savers, non-savers serve a function similar to
habit for smoothing aggregate consumption.





t (j,l)dl, where lS
t (j,l) is the amount of labor input l supplied by
saver j. Hours are demand-driven, and each household j works suﬃcient hours to meet the
market demand for the chosen monopolistic wage rates. The wage decisions are delegated
to unions, which are discussed below.


























+ bt(j) , (2)
where τL
t , τK
t , and τC
t are tax rates on labor income, capital income, and consumption,
and zt(j) represents lump-sum government transfers. Wt(l) is the nominal wage rate for
labor input l, and Pt is the general consumer price, inclusive of consumption taxes. At time
t, household j purchases bt (j) units of government debt, which pays Rtbt (j)/πt+1 units of
consumption goods at t+1, where πt+1 ≡ Pt+1/Pt is the gross inﬂation rate for the consumer
price index. dt(j) is dividends received from proﬁts of the monopolistic ﬁrms, and it(j) is
saver j’s gross investment. Note that introducing consumption taxes causes a wedge between
the producer price index, ¯ Pt, and the consumer index, given by Pt = (1+τc
t ) ¯ Pt. We assume
that no indirect taxes are paid on purchases of investment goods, so that the price index of
investment goods is the wholesale price ¯ Pt,7 as in Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009).
Savers control both the size of the capital stock kt−1 and its utilization rate vt. A higher
utilization rate is associated with a higher depreciation rate of capital:
δ[vt(j)] = δ0 + δ1(vt (j) − 1) +
δ2
2
(vt (j) − 1)
2 , (3)
as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). We calibrate δ1 so that v = 1 in the steady state.








The law of motion for private capital is given by















×it (j) is investment the adjustment cost, as in Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). By assumption, s(1) = s′ (1) = 0, and
s′′ (1) ≡ s > 0. In addition, the adjustment cost is subject to an investment-speciﬁc eﬃciency
shock ui
t.
1.1.2. Non-savers. Non-savers have the same preferences as savers, receive the same lump-
sum government transfers, and consume all their disposable income each period. The budget
constraint in units of consumption goods for the non-saver j ∈ (1 −  ,1] is
c
N









t (j,l)dl + zt(j) . (5)
7Dividing the wholesale price index by the consumer price index leaves the tax wedge, which shows up in
the investment cost of it (j) in units of consumption goods
it(j)
1+τc
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1.2. Wage Setting and Labor Aggregation. To introduce wage rigidities, we assume
that monopolistic unions set the wages for the diﬀerentiated labor services, following Colciago
(2007) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009). Households supply diﬀerentiated labor
inputs to a continuum of unions, indexed by l. Households are distributed uniformly across
the unions, implying that the aggregate demand for a speciﬁc labor input is spread uniformly
across all households. Therefore, in equilibrium the total hours worked for savers and non-
savers are equal: LS
t (j) = LN
t (j) =
R 1
0 lt (l)dl ≡ Lt.
A perfectly competitive labor packer purchases the diﬀerentiated labor inputs and assem-
bles them to produce a composite labor service Lt (sold to intermediate goods producing












t denotes a time-varying exogenous markup to wages.
The demand function for a competitive labor packer, derived from solving their proﬁt
maximization problem subject to (6), is


















measures the elasticity of substitution between labor inputs.
In each period, a union receives a signal to reset its nominal wage with probability (1 − ωw).
Those who cannot reoptimize index their wages to past inﬂation according to the rule





where χw ∈ [0,1] introduces a backward looking component in the inﬂation process. Unions
that receive the signal choose the optimal nominal wage rate ˜ Wt (l) to maximize the lifetime


























subject to four constraints: the aggregate budget constraints for savers and non-savers and
the individual and aggregate labor demand functions. Since hours worked are equal in
equilibrium, we drop the superscripts for savers and non-savers.
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1.3. Firms and Price Setting. The production sector consists of intermediate and ﬁnal
goods producing ﬁrms. A perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods producer uses a continuum of
intermediate goods yt(i), where i ∈ [0,1], to produce the ﬁnal goods, Yt, according to the










≥ Yt , (11)
where η
p
t denotes an exogenous time-varying markup to the intermediate goods’ prices.
We denote the price of the intermediate goods i as ¯ pt(i) and the price of ﬁnal goods Yt as
¯ Pt. The ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrm chooses Yt and yt(i) to maximize proﬁts subject to the
















t is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistic competitors in their product market. Firm











where α ∈ [0,1], and αG ≥ 0 is the elasticity of output with respect to government capital
KG
t−1. ua
t denotes a covariance stationary technology shock.
Analogous to labor unions, a monopolistic intermediate ﬁrm has a probability of (1 − ωp)
each period to reset its price. Firms that cannot reset optimally index their prices to past
inﬂation according to the rule





Firms that can reset optimally choose their price ¯ pt(i) to maximize the expected sum of
discounted future real proﬁts. In a symmetric equilibrium, where pt (i) = pt, the producer




















1.4. Monetary Policy. The monetary authority follows a Taylor-type rule, in which the
nominal interest rate Rt responds to its lagged value, the current inﬂation rate, and current
output. We denote a variable in percentage deviations from the steady state by a caret, as
in ˆ Rt. Speciﬁcally, the interest rate is set according to
ˆ Rt = ρr ˆ Rt−1 + (1 − ρr)
h
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1.5. Fiscal Policy. Each period the government collects tax revenues and issues one-period
nominal bonds to ﬁnance its interest payments and expenditures, which include government
consumption GC
t , government investment GI
t, and transfer payments to the households. The
























t + Zt . (17)
We assume that government investment can be productive. The law of motion for government












Fiscal variables respond to the state of the economy according to the following rules:
ˆ τ
K
t = ρKˆ τ
K
t−1 + (1 − ρK)
￿











t = ρLˆ τ
L
t−1 + (1 − ρL)
￿











t = ρGC ˆ G
C







t = ρGI ˆ G
I




















Yt−1 , and ǫs
t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,1) for s = {K, L, GC, GI, C, Z}.
When the debt-to-output ratio rises above its steady state level, the government can adjust
income taxes, government consumption and investment, or transfers to stabilize debt growth.
Among the general equilibrium studies with government debt, the vast majority allow for a
limited set of ﬁscal instruments to ensure ﬁscal solvency. For example, Erceg, Guerrieri, and
Gust (2005), Coenen and Straub (2005), and Ratto, Roeger, and in’t Veld (2009) allow only
lump-sum taxes to respond to debt. Kumhof and Laxton (2007) have several instruments
respond to debt but leave out capital taxes. Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009), Lopez-
Salido and Rabanal (2006), Iwata (2009), and Zubairy (2009) allow for income taxes but not
government spending to respond to debt. Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) ﬁnd that in the
U.S. postwar data, labor and capital taxes, government spending, and transfers all play a role
in controlling debt growth. Thus, we allow all ﬁscal instruments, aside from consumption
taxes, to respond to debt. In our data set, consumption taxes consist of federal excise taxes
and custom duties, which have an average share of GDP of less than one percent.
To capture the role of income taxes as automatic stabilizers, capital and labor taxes are
allowed to respond to output contemporaneously (ϕK,ϕL ≥ 0). Because changes in income
tax codes often involve changes in labor and capital taxes simultaneously, we also allow an
unexpected exogenous movement in one tax rate to aﬀect the other rate, as captured by
φKL in (19) and (20). We do not allow transfers to include an automatic stabilizer response.
Although some transfer components such as food stamps and unemployment insurance are
countercyclical, they only take a small share (about 5 percent on average) of the federal
transfers data in our sample.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 9
1.6. Aggregation. We denote the aggregate quantity of a variable xt by its capital letter




ct(j)dj = (1 −  )c
S
t +  c
N
t .




zt(j)dj = zt .
Because only savers have access to the asset and capital markets, aggregate bonds, private




bt(j)dj = (1 −  )bt , Kt =
Z 1
0




it(j)dj = (1 −  )it , Dt =
Z 1
0
dt(j)dj = (1 −  )dt .
Finally, the goods market clearing condition is






We estimate the model with U.S. quarterly data from 1983Q1 to 2008Q1. The choice of
the sample period is driven by two stability considerations: (1) monetary policy is thought
to be characterized by a Taylor rule [Taylor (1993)] over this period; and (2) on average,
monetary policy is thought to have been active and ﬁscal policy passive (in the sense of
Leeper (1991)).8
We use Bayesian inference methods to construct the parameters’ posterior distribution,
which is a combination of the likelihood function and prior information (see An and Schorfheide
(2007) for a survey).9 The likelihood function is estimated using 12 observables, including
real aggregate consumption, investment, labor, wages, the nominal interest rate, the gross
inﬂation rate, and ﬁscal variables—capital, labor, and consumption tax revenues, real gov-
ernment consumption and investment, and transfers.10 Although the literature typically uses
ﬁscal variables of all governments, our ﬁscal variables are for the federal government only.
Because state and local governments generally have balanced-budget rules of various forms,
ﬁscal ﬁnancing decisions are likely to diﬀer across federal and state and local governments,
8When a longer sample is used, regime-switching between active and passive monetary and ﬁscal policies is
a more pronounced issue. Davig and Leeper (2006) ﬁnd evidence for regime-switching in the postwar U.S.
data. Because the monetary and ﬁscal policy rules we estimate are assumed to have constant coeﬃcients for
inﬂation and debt, we select a sample period where, on average, monetary policy is active and ﬁscal policy
is passive.
9The estimation appendix includes details of the estimation, diagnostics, and additional results.
10By not including debt, the invertibility test in Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson
(2007) fails. However, posterior mode estimation based on simulated data shows that our observables can
recover true parameters well. If we include debt as an observable, then one ﬁscal variable must be dropped
to avoid singularity. This makes us unable to accurately estimate the standard deviation of the dropped
ﬁscal variable, which further prevents us from conducting historical decompositions later.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 10
and we only consider modeling the former. Appendix A provides a detailed description of
the data. We detrend the logarithm of each time series with its own linear trend, except for
the nominal interest rate, which is detrended by the trend in inﬂation.11
2.1. Prior Distributions. We impose dogmatic priors over several parameters that are
hard to identify from the data. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.99, which implies an
annual steady-state real interest rate of 4 percent. The capital income share of total output,
α, is set to 0.36, implying a labor income share of 0.64. The quarterly depreciation rate for
private capital, δ0, is set to 0.025 so that the annual depreciation rate is 10 percent. We set
δG = 0.02, comparable to the calibrated value in DSGE models with productive investment
[Baxter and King (1993) and Kamps (2004)]. We assume that the steady state elasticity
of substitution in the goods and labor market ((1 + ηp)/ηp, (1 + ηw)/ηw) is 8, implying
the steady-state markups in the product and labor markets are approximately 14 percent.
This is consistent with evidence that the average price markup of U.S. ﬁrms is around 10-15
percent [Basu and Fernald (1995)]. Since there appears to be no consensus in the literature
for the average markup in the U.S. labor market, we pick the same value for ηw by symmetry.
The steady-state inﬂation rate, π, is assumed to be 1.
The elasticity of output to government capital, αG, cannot be identiﬁed without informa-
tion about the capital stocks. The empirical literature has a wide range of values for αG,
ranging from a small negative number [Evans and Karras (1994)], to zero [Kamps (2004)], to
near 0.4 [Pereira and de Frutos (1999)]. For the baseline estimation, we make a conservative
assumption on the productiveness of public capital and calibrate αG = 0.05. Sensitivity
analysis explores two alternative cases where αG = 0 and αG = 0.1. We ﬁnd that the data
cannot distinguish between the three values for αG (see Table 3), as the log marginal data
densities in the three cases are virtually identical.
The rest of the calibrated parameters are steady-state ﬁscal variables computed from the
means of our data sample: The federal government consumption to output share is 0.070,
the federal government investment to output share is 0.004, the federal debt to annualized
output share is 0.386, the average marginal federal labor tax rate is 0.209, the capital tax
rate is 0.196, and ﬁnally, the consumption tax rate is 0.015. When computing these shares,
we use an output measure that is consistent with our model speciﬁcation—namely, the sum
of consumption, investment, and total government purchases.
Columns 2 to 5 in Table 1 list the prior distributions for all estimated parameters. Our
priors are similar to those in Smets and Wouters (2007) for the parameters found in both
models. The domains cover a range of values estimated by previous studies (see Smets and
Wouters (2003) and (2007) for a review of previous estimates).
A parameter less encountered in the literature is the share of non-savers,  . Forni, Mon-
teforte, and Sessa (2009) and Iwata (2009) center the prior at 0.5 but obtain an estimate
11There is no consensus in the literature on a detrending method (see Canova (2009) for a discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of various detrending methods). An alternative approach is to allow
some shocks to be non-stationary and match the demeaned data to its model counterparts. Since several
ﬁscal variables appear to have their own trends in the data, allowing some shocks to be non-stationary
is nontrivial. In addition, it is unclear which non-ﬁscal shocks should be modeled as non-stationary, as
various ones have been proposed to better match the data (see Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997),
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000), and Chang, Doh, and Schorfheide (2007)).WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 11
around 0.35. Lopez-Salido and Rabanal’s (2006) estimate using U.S. data over a similar
sample period is between 0.10 to 0.39. Based on this information, we choose a beta prior
with a mean of 0.3 and standard deviation equal to 0.1.
The priors for the ﬁscal parameters are chosen to be fairly diﬀuse and cover a reasonably
large range of the parameter space. To stabilize debt as a share of output, government spend-
ing and transfers should respond negatively to a debt increase, and taxes should respond
positively. We assume normal distributions for the ﬁscal instruments’ responses to debt
(γGC,γGI,γK,γL, and γZ) with a mean of 0.15 and standard deviation of 0.1. While these
priors place a larger probability mass in the regions of expected signs, a small probability
is allowed for the opposite signs. Our guidance to determine the prior range for the γ’s is
based on two considerations. First, when the γ’s are too high, overshooting occurs, resulting
in oscillation patterns that are not observed in the data. Second, when the γ’s are too low,
under active monetary policy, there does not exist an equilibrium.
As capital and labor taxes are progressive in the tax code, we restrict ϕK and ϕL to be
positive, following a gamma distribution. Since we incorporate Social Security taxes in our
labor tax revenues, the labor tax rate elasticity is expected to be a value below the capital
tax rate elasticity (since Social Security contributions have a cap and are regressive). The
parameter measuring the co-movement between capital and labor tax rates (σKL) is assumed
to have a normal distribution with a mean of 0.2 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The domain
covers the range of past estimates for this parameter [see Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010)
and Yang (2005)].
A priori, our model does not impose restrictions on whether government debt crowds out
or in investment. Table 2 quantiﬁes the extent of crowding out based on 30,000 draws from
the prior and posterior distributions. The top rows record the percentage of draws that lead
investment to decline on impact of various ﬁscal shocks. Except for government consumption
and transfer increases, the priors can deliver positive or negative investment responses on
impact following expansionary ﬁscal policy shocks. The bottom rows report the 5th and 95th
cumulative present-value investment multipliers following various ﬁscal shocks.12 With the
exception of a government investment increase or consumption tax decrease, the priors allow
the 90 percent interval of the investment multipliers to cover both signs, indicating that the
path of investment can vary qualitatively for various parameter combinations. Even though
the present-value investment multipliers for government investment always are positive and
for consumption taxes always are negative, on impact the priors do not restrict the sign of
the investment response. Thus, in these cases (as well as the others) the model allows for the
longer-term dynamics to vary qualitatively from the short-run dynamics. Section 3 explores
the economics of both short-run and longer-run responses to expansionary ﬁscal shocks.
2.2. Posterior Estimates. The last two columns of table 1 provide the mean, and 90th
percentiles from the posterior distributions. Because the prior and posterior 90th percentiles
for the labor preference parameter, κ, and the responses of tax rates to contemporaneous
12 Investment multipliers are deﬁned as the present-value sum of investment changes in levels divided by the
present-value sum of changes in a ﬁscal variable. Depending on the ﬁscal shock that triggers debt growth,
the denominator can be changes in capital, labor, or consumption tax revenues, government consumption
or investment, or transfers. The sums are over 1000 quarters, and present values are discounted by the
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output, ϕK and ϕL, are very similar, it appears these parameters are not well identiﬁed from
the data.
Overall, the estimates for the common parameters in New Keynesian models are compa-
rable to others estimated with postwar U.S. data [Smets and Wouters (2007), Del Negro,
Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007), and Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, and
Rubio-Ramirez (2010)]. Our estimate of the risk aversion parameter is larger than the values
estimated or calibrated in previous studies, implying an intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion of 0.37.13 The rest of this section discusses parameters less frequently encountered in
the literature and how well the model ﬁts the data.
2.2.1. Fraction of non-savers. The mean estimate for the fraction of non-savers   is 0.18,
and the 5th and 95th percentiles are [0.10, 0.27]. The relatively low fraction of non-savers
suggests the importance of forward-looking behavior in explaining the aggregate eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy. Although myopic behavior has been important in explaining ﬁscal policy eﬀects
in the literature since Mankiw (2000) and Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), our mean
estimate is much smaller than the commonly calibrated value of 0.5, based on single-equation
estimation of a consumption function [Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Gali, Lopez-Salido,
and Valles (2007)]. Previous studies have incorporated non-savers into models so that ag-
gregate consumption can increase following a positive government spending shock. Given
the mean estimates for the benchmark model, our model requires a fraction of 0.45 in order
to deliver a positive short-term consumption response to an increase in government con-
sumption, which falls outside the 90-percent interval. Our results are consistent with vector
autoregression (VAR) estimates. VARs with either federal government consumption alone or
the sum of federal government consumption and investment ﬁnd that, for our sample period
(1983Q1 to 2008Q1), an increase in government spending does not have a positive eﬀect on
consumption.14
2.2.2. Fiscal rules. Most ﬁscal instruments have the expected signs for their responses to
government debt as a share of output, despite the fact that the priors allow for the opposite
signs. We ﬁnd that the federal government relies on raising income taxes and reducing
government consumption to stabilize debt, as in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010). The
mean estimate for government investment’s response is negative, but the 90-percent interval
encompasses zero (as does the 90-percent interval for the response of transfers to debt),
indicating that government investments (and transfers) were not used systematically for
controlling debt growth.
13The literature has a wide range of estimates for this parameter [Guvenen (2006)].
14The VARs are ordered with government spending ﬁrst, followed by GDP, consumption, and investment.
Identiﬁcation is achieved using a Cholesky decomposition. The evidence of the positive consumption response
following a government spending shock found in the literature [e.g. Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) and
Bouakez and Rebei (2007)] is based on a longer postwar U.S. sample. VARs based on shorter, more recent
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2.3. Debt Dynamics. Historical decompositions in Figure 1 show the model-implied dy-
namics of real debt and the real primary deﬁcit (deﬁned as the sum of government con-
sumption, investment, and transfers less total tax revenues).15 The top row presents the
breakdown of all shocks organized by monetary, ﬁscal (aggregating tax, government spend-
ing, and transfers), and structural (aggregating all non-policy) shocks; the bottom two panels
further decompose among the six ﬁscal shocks. The thick solid lines are the model-implied
data series, and the units on the y-axis are percentage deviations from the steady-state path.
The bottom two panels plot the decomposition for the six ﬁscal shocks. They suggest that
the dominant driving forces (in the order from the darkest to lightest shade) are shocks to
government consumption, capital taxes, labor taxes, and transfers.
Overall, ﬁscal shocks are the most important sources for movements in real debt. The series
implies that the ﬁscal position gradually worsened throughout the 1980s. The increases in
federal government consumption and investment (rising from about 8 percent of GDP in
1979 to 10 percent in 1986) and the reductions in individual and corporate income tax rates
(enacted in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986) are the
main factors contributing to this surge. Debt steadily declined from 1996 until 2000. The
improvement was mainly due to an increase in individual income tax rates on the relatively
high income brackets (enacted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993) and a
decrease in federal spending (falling from 9 percent in 1990 to about 6 percent in the late
1990s). The model-implied deﬁcit series experiences a small spike in 1991, moving from
above the trend to below the trend in the ﬁrst quarter of 1991 before continuing to further
increase above the trend until approximately 1993. This corresponds with the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990’s enactment to increase the highest income tax rates,
which became eﬀective January 1, 1991.
In addition to ﬁscal shocks, monetary policy shocks also play an important role in real
debt movements. Starting in 1994, monetary policy shocks oﬀset ﬁscal innovations to reduce
debt. Positive interest rate disturbances drove up the real value of debt by increasing interest
rate payments. This corresponds with the Federal Reserve’s actions. Starting in 1994, the
Fed raised the federal funds rate in anticipation of increasing future inﬂation rates, as noted
by Kohn (1995). Analogously, when the federal funds rate was gradually lowered, starting
on January 3, 2001, in response to the economic downturn, monetary policy contributed to
lowering the real value of debt.
3. Crowding Out By Government Debt
Fiscal and monetary shocks are the main driving forces for the real value of U.S. govern-
ment debt in the post-1983 sample. This section investigates the economics underlying the
links between investment and government debt, focusing on the debt changes driven by ﬁscal
and monetary policy shocks.
15We use the posterior mean estimates and the Kalman smoother to obtain values of the innovations for each
shock. The discrepancies between the model-implied values and the shock contributions are due to initial
conditions. See Alvarez-Lois, Harrison, Piscitelli, and Scott (2008) for more details on the construction of
the decomposition.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 14






t and ξt are the Lagrangian multipliers for the constraints (2) and (4) in the savers’ utility
optimization problem. qt has the interpretation of the shadow price of increasing capital at
the end of t by one unit. Investment tends to rise with qt. The log-linearized expression of
Tobin’s q from its steady state is
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Pt is the real rate of return for private capital.
Consistent with the conventional view, the negative coeﬃcient on the real interest rate
( ˆ Rt − Etˆ πt+1) indicates that a higher real rate discourages investment. Equation (26) also
points out that investment decisions are inﬂuenced by several other factors. A higher ex-
pected real return on capital makes agents want to invest more, but a higher expected
capital tax rate does the opposite. In the model, the consumption tax shock serves as a
relative price shock between consumption and investment, because consumption taxes are
levied only on consumption goods. An increase in the consumption tax signals a fall in the
price of investment goods relative to consumption goods. In contrast, expectations of future
cheaper investment goods, through an expected increase in the future consumption tax rate,
delay investment decisions. The higher expected shadow price indicates that capital is more
valuable in the future, so it encourages current investment. Finally, by iterating on this
equation, we see that investment depends not only on the current values of these variables,
but on their entire expected future paths. Next, we examine how ﬁscal and monetary shocks
aﬀect investment decisions.
3.1. Fiscal Policy and Crowding Out. When a ﬁscal shock hits the economy, it has a
direct eﬀect on the evolution of variables from the shock itself and a secondary eﬀect through
future debt ﬁnancing. Delayed ﬁnancing causes government debt to accumulate, which brings
forth future policy adjustments that can aﬀect both the current economy (through policy
expectations) and the future economy (through the implementation of policy adjustments).
We ﬁrst look at the relationship between debt and investment implied by the overall eﬀect
of a ﬁscal policy shock. Later we contrast the results with the net eﬀect from debt ﬁnancing.
Figures 2 and 3 show one standard deviation impulse responses to all policy shocks. The
solid lines are the responses under the posterior mean estimates. The dotted-dashed lines
give the 5th and 95th percentiles based on the posterior distributions. The y-axis measures
percentage deviation from the steady state, and the x-axis denotes the number of years after
a shock.
Although all the expansionary ﬁscal shocks cause government debt to grow, investment
can rise or fall, depending on the type of shock. When government investment increases
or the capital tax rate decreases, higher debt is associated with higher private investment,
as shown by the solid lines in the second and third columns of Figure 2. An increase in
productive government investment implies a higher stock of future public capital, which
raises the marginal product of private capital (Et ˆ RK
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the capital tax rate directly increases the after-tax rate of return for investment. Because
the tax shock is persistent, this lowers expectations of future capital tax rates. In the
conventional view crowding out results from decreases in national saving, which drives up
the real interest rate and lowers investment. We see that if a debt expansion is due to an
increase in government investment or a decrease in the capital tax rate, the higher expected
return to capital or the lower expected capital tax rate causes investment to rise despite a
higher interest rate, as suggested by equation (26).
When labor or consumption tax rates decrease (the ﬁrst and second columns of Figure 3),
the probability intervals allow for investment to be crowded in or out in the short run. A
negative labor tax shock increases labor demand, which drives up the marginal product of
capital, and hence makes agents want to invest more. However, the deﬁcit-ﬁnanced labor
tax cut induces policy adjustments, which involve higher capital and labor tax rates and
lower government spending. For most combinations of parameters drawn from the posterior
distributions, these ﬁscal adjustments discourage investment (income tax adjustments deter
investment, as can be seen from equation (26)). For the reduction in the consumption
tax rate, the direct eﬀect is a reduction in investment as investment goods become more
expensive than consumption goods. The initial positive response of investment is driven
by the monetary authority’s interest rate response: the more aggressively the monetary
authority stabilizes prices (following the decrease in the consumer’s price level), the more
the real interest rate declines, which drives up investment. Investment is crowded out despite
a lower interest rate in the medium-run.
Among the six ﬁscal shocks, the only two shocks that produce debt eﬀects largely consistent
with the conventional view are government consumption and transfers shocks. The ﬁrst
column of Figure 2 shows that following an increase in government consumption, the real
interest rate rises and investment falls. When the government absorbs a larger share of goods,
it leaves the private sector with fewer goods to invest. As goods become more valuable,
the real interest rate rises to clear the goods market. A similar pattern is also observed
with the transfer shock (the third column of Figure 3). Rising transfers increase aggregate
consumption because non-savers consume more due to higher disposable income. Higher
demand for goods drives up the real interest rate, discouraging investment.
The above discussion shows that a debt expansion need not lead the real interest rate to
rise and investment to fall. The relationships among these variables depend on which ﬁscal
innovation triggers the debt growth.
3.1.1. Distortionary debt ﬁnancing. One important channel in which government debt can
aﬀect the economy is through policy adjustments necessary to stabilize debt. To understand
the eﬀects of distortionary debt ﬁnancing, we construct a hypothetical economy that is
identical to the benchmark economy except for the manner in which government debt is
ﬁnanced. In the hypothetical economy, the government follows a balanced budget rule, and
γGC = γGI = γK = γL = γZ = 0. We introduce a new lump-sum tax Xt on savers, which
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Because savers possess rational expectations and have access to asset markets, the lump-sum
tax is non-distorting and does not aﬀect savers’ marginal decisions. In this economy, the
dynamics of aggregate variables are not aﬀected by the lump-sum tax Xt, and no government
debt accumulates. This is the only way in which the hypothetical economy diﬀers from the
estimated model.
Returning to Figures 2 and 3, we now examine the dashed line responses—the diﬀerences
between the responses of the benchmark and hypothetical economies computed using the
posterior mean parameter values, or the responses due solely to distortionary ﬁnancing of
debt. The investment responses are mostly negative, with the exception of the government
investment shock. This indicates that the negative eﬀect on investment is more pronounced
under distortionary ﬁscal ﬁnancing. At the same time, the diﬀerences between the responses
of the real interest rate in the two economies are negligible, demonstrating that the diﬀerences
in the investment movements are not due to interest rate eﬀects.
It is worth noting that among the ﬁve ﬁscal instruments allowed to respond to debt
growth, not every instrument has a negative eﬀect on investment. Raising capital or labor
tax rates and reducing government investment has negative impacts on investment, but
cutting government consumption or transfers does not. Thus, the eﬀect of debt ﬁnancing
depends crucially on the policy combination to retire debt. Our estimates suggest capital and
labor taxes have undertaken most ﬁscal adjustments in the post-83 period, which explains
why distortionary ﬁscal ﬁnancing have a negative eﬀect on investment.
3.2. Monetary Policy and Crowding Out. The historical decompositions in Section 2.3
show that monetary policy shocks are important for real debt movements. In addition,
the literature has noted that monetary policy can inﬂuence the degree of crowding out [for
example, Buiter and Tobin (1980) and Brunner and Meltzer (1972)].
The last column of Figure 3 reports the impulse responses to a debt surge driven by an
exogenous tightening in monetary policy (an increase in the nominal interest rate). A higher
nominal interest rate leads the price level to fall and hence the real interest rate to rise. This
induces savers to substitute away from capital and into government bonds. The real value of
government debt rises because the higher nominal rate increases interest payments to service
debt. Because the debt growth is accompanied by a rising real rate and declining investment,
it is consistent with the conventional view on crowding out. This implies that reduced-form
regressions that do not control for monetary policy could ﬁnd a positive relationship between
debt and real interest rates and conclude crowding out occurs, even if the eﬀect is due to
monetary—not ﬁscal—policy.
To further investigate how monetary policy can inﬂuence the degree of crowding out, we
compare the responses to various ﬁscal shocks under diﬀerent response magnitudes of the
nominal interest rate to inﬂation and output: φπ = 1.05, 1.7, and 2.5; φY = 0, 0.11, and
0.3. All other parameters are kept at their posterior mean estimates. Figure 4 depicts the
responses following exogenous changes of one standard deviation in each ﬁscal instrument
(as in Figures 2 and 3) under three φπ values. The y-axis is in percentage deviation from
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3.2.1. Response magnitudes to inﬂation. Varying how aggressively the monetary authority
reacts to inﬂation can have qualitative and quantitative eﬀects on the responses of variables
following expansionary ﬁscal shocks. The monetary authority’s hawkishness inﬂuences inﬂa-
tion expectations and the real rate, which can change the short-run response of investment
under some values of φπ.
Following an increase in government consumption or transfers, the price level rises due
to increased demand. The weaker the monetary authority’s reaction to inﬂation (i.e. the
lower the value of φπ), the more likely the real interest rate is to decrease, and the smaller
the crowding out by government debt, as shown by the ﬁrst and last columns of Figure
4. Crowding out for an increase in government consumption or transfers is smallest when
φπ = 1.05. Following the labor tax cut, the price level falls initially because of increased
production but soon turns positive from higher consumption. When the monetary authority
is more dovish, the real interest rate can turn negative, and government debt can crowd in
investment under φπ = 1.05 for the ﬁrst year, compared with the crowding out result under
φπ = 1.7,2.5.
In contrast, the positive investment response is the smallest (or can turn negative) under
government investment or capital tax shocks when φπ = 1.05. Both shocks initially reduce
the price level due to increased levels of production. When the monetary authority is more
dovish, the real interest rate rises more, discouraging investment. In the case of a government
investment increase, under φπ = 1.05, government debt crowds out investment for the ﬁrst
two years, before it turns positive. As the price level falls more under the smaller value of φπ,
the real marginal cost of production is also higher, leading proﬁts to fall. Declining proﬁts
reduce the demand for capital, and hence, investment can be below its steady-state level in
the short run (as shown by the dashed lines).
For the consumption tax shock, investment can also be crowded in or out in the short run
depending on the value of φπ. As mentioned earlier, a lower consumption tax rate makes
investment goods relatively more expensive than consumption goods, leading investment
to decline. However, higher values for φπ lead to larger declines in the real interest rate
following a consumption tax shock, driving up invest. As shown by the dashed-dotted lines
in the second to the last column in Figure 4, when φπ = 2.5, government debt can crowd in
investment in the short run under a reduction in the consumption tax rate.
3.2.2. Response magnitudes to output. Although we do not observe a systematic relation-
ship between the monetary authority’s response to inﬂation and investment, a systematic
relationship exists between the monetary authority’s response to output and investment. A
larger value of φY is associated with a smaller investment response—either a less positive or
more negative response. Higher φY values imply that the central bank raises the nominal
interest rate more in response to an output expansion due to a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced ﬁscal inter-
vention. A higher nominal interest rate implies a higher real rate (either a more positive
or less negative change), which induces agents to demand more government bonds and less
capital; hence, investment rises less (or falls more). For the case of a government investment
increase or consumption tax decrease, private investment can, in the short run, be crowded
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4. Reduced-Form Estimates
The results of the previous section suggest that a causal relationship between government
debt, investment, and real interest rates is diﬃcult to infer without controlling for which
policy innovation triggers a debt expansion. Thus, the prevailing empirical approach to
search for evidence of crowding out by focusing on the reduced-form relationship between
government debt or deﬁcits and real interest rates is inappropriate and subject to serious
identiﬁcation problems.
To demonstrate this, we simulate 500 data series using the mean estimates of the posterior
distribution,16 and estimate the reduced-form OLS equations





t = β0 + β1ˆ s
b
t + ǫt
for each data series. ˆ sb
t is the model-implied debt-to-GDP ratio, and ˆ rt is the model-implied
one period real interest rate. Because the literature often focuses on the relationship between
debt and interest rates with a longer horizon, we also construct ˆ r10
t , the model-implied ten-
year real rate, which is generated by imposing the pure expectations hypothesis of the term
structure.
Table 4 displays the estimates for the mean and 90-percent interval of β1 from the re-
gressions. The reduced-form estimates from the model can be positive, negative, or zero.
The relationship depends strongly on the relative magnitudes of the simulated disturbances.
When only government consumption shocks or monetary policy shocks are simulated (and
all other disturbances are set to zero), there is a small, positive relationship between the ten-
year real interest rate and the debt-to-GDP ratio, consistent with the impulse responses in
Figure 2. In contrast, when only labor tax shocks are simulated, the reduced-form relation-
ship is estimated as negative or zero. This result oﬀers an explanation as to why empirical
studies that focus on the reduced-form relationship between interest rates and debt are often
inconclusive. Because the real interest rate movements depend on the source of the shocks
that result in debt growth, and because diﬀerent shocks can have diﬀerent implications for
interest rates, the estimated sign depends on the relative magnitudes of innovations and,
thus, the sample period estimated.
Aside from producing a wide range of reduced-form estimates on the coeﬃcient of debt to
interest rates, the model, using the estimated sequence of historical innovations (calculated
using the Kalman smoother), can reproduce magnitudes of β1 comparable to the litera-
ture. Table 5 gives the reduced-form estimates using the mean parameters of the posterior
distribution, as well as the 90-percent intervals of reduced-form estimates from the entire
posterior distribution of the parameters. A one percentage increase in the debt-to-GDP
ratio from its steady-state value is estimated, using the mean parameters, to increase the
ten-year real interest rate by 2.7 basis points. Previous studies [Laubach (2009), Engen and
Hubbard (2005), and Gale and Orszag (2004)] ﬁnd that a one-percentage point increase in
the government debt to GDP ratio leads to an increase of approximately three to six basis
points in the real interest rate. For instance, Engen and Hubbard (2005) estimate a 4.7
16For each case, we simulate a series 1000 periods long and burn the ﬁrst 900 periods, leaving a sample size
comparable to our data series.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 19
basis point increase, which falls within the range of estimates from the posterior distribution
(the values in parenthesis in Table 5). Furthermore, 61 percent of the regression estimates
were insigniﬁcant at the 10 percent level, consistent with the ﬁndings of Engen and Hubbard
(2005).
Given the complicated interactions among debt, interest rates, and investment, it is not
surprising that the reduced-form approach cannot identify crowding out by government debt.
This suggests that one should be cautious in interpreting reduced-form relationships between
the real interest rate and debt as evidence of crowding out.
5. Counterfactual Applications
DSGE estimation provides an analytical framework to assess the eﬀects of historical policy
interventions. Having estimated ﬁscal innovations from the data, we pursue two counterfac-
tual exercises to examine the eﬀects of two ﬁscal interventions; the ﬁrst was intended to rein
in debt growth (the tax increases and spending cuts in the 1990s), and the second aimed to
stimulate the economy (the tax cuts in the early 2000s).
5.1. The Impact of Tax Increases in the 1990s. We ask how the economy would have
evolved if there had been no ﬁscal policy innovations from 1993Q1 to 1997Q2, a period of
contractionary ﬁscal policy (roughly between the enactment of the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1993 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997). Figure 5 plots ﬁve paths of key
macroeconomic variables in the model: solid lines are conditional on the estimated sequence
of all shocks; dashed lines are conditional on the estimated sequence of all shocks except
capital and labor tax disturbances; dotted lines are conditional on the estimated sequence
of all shocks except expenditure shocks (government consumption, government investment,
and transfer shocks); dotted-dashed lines are conditional on the estimated sequence of all
shocks except ﬁscal policy shocks; and dots are conditional on the estimated sequence of all
shocks except the monetary policy shock.
The real value of federal government debt would have continued to grow if exogenous tax
changes (tax movements in addition to those implied by the endogenous feedback in the tax
rules) had not occurred. The capital and labor tax increases enacted over the period led debt
to be 11 percent lower than it otherwise would have been by the second quarter of 1997. To
a lesser extent, innovations to government consumption and investment, consumption taxes,
and transfers also contributed to debt retirement; debt would have been 6 percent higher
without changes to these ﬁscal instruments. The contractionary tax actions had a negative
eﬀect on private investment: investment would have been about 7 percent higher without
the tax increases. This provides evidence that ﬁscal adjustments, which are necessary to
maintain budget sustainability, can have nontrivial negative eﬀects on the economy. If the
government had delayed actions to control the debt growth, the consequences to retire debt
would have been more severe because the magnitude of the tax increases necessary to oﬀset
the debt growth would have been larger.
In contrast, when all ﬁscal policy shocks during this period are turned oﬀ, investment
would have been 0.5 percent lower than its observed path in the second quarter of 1997.
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a positive eﬀect on investment (but a negative eﬀect on output). This eﬀect oﬀsets the
negative investment response from higher tax rates. Thus, the eﬀects of debt retirement for
individual historical episodes depend on the speciﬁc combination of ﬁscal adjustments.
Figure 5 also shows the eﬀects of monetary policy disturbances over the period. During
this episode, the monetary authority raised the nominal interest rate to combat inﬂationary
pressures. Without these positive monetary policy shocks, output and inﬂation would have
been higher and government debt lower (because interest payments would have been lower
without the increased interest rates). Over this period, the ﬁscal authority acted to reduce
the deﬁcit, while the monetary authority’s actions worked to sustain it. In addition, the
monetary authority acted to reduce inﬂation while the ﬁscal authority’s actions, particularly
the tax increases, contributed to inﬂationary pressures.
5.2. The Impact of Tax Cuts in 2001 and 2002. Next, we ask how the economy would
have evolved if capital and labor tax or monetary policy innovations were turned oﬀ from
2001Q3 to 2002Q4 (after the enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2001). Because monetary and ﬁscal policies were both adopted to counteract the
recession in 2001, we examine the relative eﬀectiveness of countercyclical ﬁscal and monetary
policies for this particular recession. Figure 6 contains three paths of key macroeconomic
variables in the model: Solid lines are conditional on the estimated sequence of all shocks;
dashed lines are conditional on the estimated sequence of all shocks except capital and labor
tax disturbances; dotted-dashed lines are conditional on the estimated sequence of all shocks
except the monetary policy shock.
The real value of federal government debt would have continued its trend of decline from
the late 1990s if discretionary tax changes had not occurred. The tax cuts made the real
value of federal debt 7 percent higher than it otherwise would have been by the end of 2002.
On the other hand, the lower interest rates due to discretionary monetary policy helped
reduce interest payments to service debt and hence the total amount of debt. The lower
nominal interest rate reduced the real value of debt by 3 percent by 2002Q4.
The tax cuts in 2001 and 2002 had mild expansionary eﬀects: In 2002Q4, consumption,
output, and investment would have been 0.5, 0.8, and 2.2 percent higher than if the tax cuts
were not enacted. Monetary policy, however, appeared to be more eﬀective in counteracting
the recession. In particular, consumption and output were 0.95 and 1.2 percent higher
than they would have been without the monetary policy interventions. Also, the eﬀects of
monetary and ﬁscal actions on inﬂation worked in the opposite directions: the monetary
authority’s actions added to inﬂationary pressures, whereas the tax cuts reduced inﬂation in
2001 and 2002.
6. Robustness Analysis
In this section we investigate the robustness of the eﬀects of expansionary ﬁscal policy on
investment under several alternative model speciﬁcations. The results of these robustness
checks are summarized in Table 6. To get a sense of how the investment response varies
quantitatively across model speciﬁcations, we report impact and cumulative present value
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6.1. Varying αG. The elasticity of output to government capital, αG, cannot be identiﬁed
from our observables. For the baseline estimation, we calibrate αG = 0.05. To determine
how sensitive our estimates and inferences are to this parameter, we estimate the model
for two alternative cases where αG = 0.001 and αG = 0.1. We ﬁnd that the data cannot
distinguish between the three values for αG (see Table 3), as the log marginal data densities
in the three cases are virtually identical. The third and third columns of Table 6 show the
investment multipliers when αG = 0.001 and αG = 0.1. Varying αG aﬀects only the multi-
pliers for government investment. When αG is very small, a government investment shock
resembles a non-productive government consumption shock. The more productive govern-
ment investment is (the larger αG is), the higher the cumulative present value multiplier is,
as the returns to investment rapidly increase.
6.2. No Automatic Stabilizers. Because the estimation for the contemporaneous re-
sponse of income tax rates to output is largely inﬂuenced by our priors (see Appendix ??), we
check whether our results are sensitive to the estimates of automatic stabilizer coeﬃcients,
ϕK and ϕL. We estimate a version of the model where these parameters are calibrated to
zero. The ﬁfth column of Table 6 shows that this substantially aﬀects only the multipliers
for government investment. Following a government investment shock, output rises as pro-
ductivity increases. Automatic stabilizers cause capital and labor taxes to increase as well,
dampening the overall eﬀects.
6.3. Standard Calibration of Consumption and Labor Supply Elasticities. Our
benchmark estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/γ) and the labor
preference parameter (κ) diﬀer from the standard values used in the real business cycle
literature. We re-estimate the model when these parameters are calibrated to more typical
values (γ = κ = 1). Again, this modiﬁcation has small quantitative eﬀects overall (shown
in the last column of Table 6). It raises the present-value government investment multiplier
and causes investment to increase on impact following a consumption tax shock.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies crowding out by U.S. government debt using a structural DSGE ap-
proach. Two contributions to the literature follow. First, we estimate a New Keynesian
model with a detailed ﬁscal speciﬁcation, which can account for the dynamics between ﬁscal
and monetary policy interactions and ﬁscal adjustments induced by debt accumulation. Most
ﬁscal instruments are found to respond to debt systematically: When the debt-to-output ra-
tio rises, the government reduces its purchases and transfers and increases income taxes to
rein in debt growth. The relatively low estimate for the fraction of non-savers suggests the
importance of forward-looking behaviors in explaining the aggregate eﬀects of ﬁscal policy.
Second, our estimation implies there is no systematic reduced-form relationship between
government debt and real interest rates. Whether crowding out by government debt occurs
depends on the type of policy innovation that brings forth debt growth. Distortionary ﬁscal
ﬁnancing and monetary policy are important for gauging the magnitude of the investment
and real interest rate responses following a debt expansion. In particular, increases in future
capital and labor taxes necessary to oﬀset debt accumulation have a negative impact onWHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 22
investment. Also, the responses of the real interest rate and investment can be inﬂuenced
by how aggressively the central bank stabilizes inﬂation and output. We demonstrate that
reduced form estimates of the relationship between debt and real interest rates depend on the
relative magnitudes of the innovations over the estimated horizon. The result helps explain
why empirical studies focusing on the relationship between interest rates and debt are often
inconclusive.
Our estimation focuses on the post-1983 U.S. sample. Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010)
ﬁnds evidence of instability in the estimates of ﬁscal policy parameters across various sample
periods. Davig and Leeper (2009) estimate Markov-switching rules for monetary and ﬁscal
policy from 1949Q1 to 2008Q4 and ﬁnd multiple regime changes among active and passive
monetary and ﬁscal policies. Confronting these instability issues and accounting for the
possibility of passive monetary policy and active ﬁscal policy in earlier samples is left for
future work.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 23
Table 1. Prior and Posterior Distributions for Estimated Parameters.
Parameters Prior Posterior
func. mean std. 90% int. mean 90% int.
Preference and technology
γ, risk aversion G 1.5 0.3 [1, 2] 2.7 [2.2,3.3]
κ, inverse Frisch labor elast. G 2 0.5 [1.3, 2.9] 2.1 [1.4,3]
µ, fraction of non-Ricar. households B 0.3 0.1 [0.14, 0.48] 0.18 [0.099,0.27]
Frictions
ωw, wage stickiness B 0.5 0.1 [0.34, 0.66] 0.69 [0.59,0.79]
ωp, price stickiness B 0.5 0.1 [0.34, 0.66] 0.82 [0.75,0.88]
ψ, capital utilization B 0.6 0.15 [0.35, 0.85] 0.38 [0.22,0.55]
s, investment adj. cost N 6 1.5 [3.5, 8.5] 7.4 [5.2,9.6]
χw, wage partial indexation B 0.5 0.15 [0.25, 0.75] 0.39 [0.19,0.62]
χp, price partial indexation B 0.5 0.15 [0.25, 0.75] 0.31 [0.13,0.54]
Fiscal policy
γGC, govt consumption resp to debt N 0.15 0.1 [-0.01, 0.3] 0.17 [0.0051,0.33]
γGI, govt investment resp to debt N 0.15 0.1 [-0.01, 0.3] 0.0033 [−0.11,0.14]
γK, capital tax resp to debt N 0.15 0.1 [-0.01, 0.3] 0.17 [0.028,0.32]
γL, labor tax resp to debt N 0.15 0.1 [-0.01, 0.3] 0.16 [0.021,0.3]
γZ, transfers resp to debt N 0.15 0.1 [-0.01, 0.3] 0.074 [−0.02,0.18]
ϕK, capital resp. to output G 0.75 0.35 [0.28, 1.4] 0.78 [0.3,1.4]
ϕL, labor resp. to output G 0.40 0.15 [0.14, 0.76] 0.43 [0.15,0.83]
Monetary policy
φπ, interest rate resp. to inﬂation N 1.5 0.25 [1.1, 1.8] 1.9 [1.6,2.3]
φy, interest rate resp. to output N 0.125 0.10 [-0.04, 0.3] 0.095 [0.048,0.15]
ρr, lagged interest rate resp. B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.86 [0.83,0.89]
Serial correl. in disturbances
ρa, technology B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.89 [0.84,0.95]
ρb, preference B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.94 [0.9,0.97]
ρi, investment B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.55 [0.41,0.68]
ρw, wage markup B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.3 [0.15,0.47]
ρp, price markup B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.34 [0.11,0.59]
ρGC, government consumption B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.96 [0.93,0.98]
ρGI, government investment B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.76 [0.64,0.86]
ρK, capital tax B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.89 [0.84,0.95]
ρL, labor tax B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.94 [0.89,0.98]
ρC, consumption tax B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.90 [0.84,0.95]
ρZ, transfer B 0.5 0.2 [0.17, 0.83] 0.79 [0.7,0.88]
Std. of shocks
σa, technology IG 0.1 2 [0.02, 0.28] 0.64 [0.56,0.74]
σb, preference IG 0.1 2 [0.02, 0.28] 2.4 [1.9,3.1]
σm, monetary policy IG 0.1 2 [0.02, 0.28] 0.14 [0.13,0.16]
σi, investment IG 0.1 2 [0.02, 0.28] 4.3 [3.6,5.2]
σw, wage markup IG 0.1 2 [0.02, 0.28] 0.27 [0.22,0.33]
σp, price markup IG 0.1 2 [0.02, 0.28] 0.19 [0.16,0.23]
σGC, government consumption IG 1 ∞ [0.21, 2.8] 2.8 [2.5,3.1]
σGI, government investment IG 1 ∞ [0.21, 2.8] 4 [3.5,4.5]
σK, capital tax IG 1 ∞ [0.21, 2.8] 4.2 [3.8,4.7]
σL, labor tax IG 1 ∞ [0.21, 2.8] 2.3 [2,2.5]
σC, consumption tax IG 1 ∞ [0.21, 2.8] 3.3 [2.9,3.7]
σZ, transfers IG 1 ∞ [0.21, 2.8] 2.6 [2.3,3]
σKL, co-movement btw K and L taxes N 0.2 0.1 [0.036, 0.36] 0.23 [0.17,0.29]WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 24
Table 2. Prior and posterior analysis. The top two rows are percentages
of prior and posterior draws that lead to crowding out of investment on impact
following various ﬁscal shocks. The bottom two rows are 90-percent intervals
of cumulative present value multipliers for prior and posterior draws following
various ﬁscal shocks. Results are based on 30,000 draws from the prior and
posterior distributions.
GC ↑ GI ↑ τK ↓ τL ↓ τC ↓ Z ↑
Impact
Prior 100% 44% 3% 70% 60% 100%
Posterior 100% 0% 0% 83% 30% 100%
PV Inv. Prior (-1.05, 0.042) (2.38, 4.28) (-1.56, 0.66) (-0.9, 0.33) (-0.53, -0.1) (-0.98, 0.072)
Multiplier Posterior (-1.52, -0.29) (0.53, 0.99) (-0.6, -0.16) (-2.24, 3.21) (-1.15, -0.01) (-0.96, -0.12)WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 25
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis. The table reports posterior means and 90%
credible intervals (in parentheses) for various models. Log-marginal data den-
sities calculated using Geweke’s (1999) modiﬁed harmonic mean estimator are
reported along with Bayes factors relative to the benchmark model. The log-




G = 0.05) αG = 0.001 α
G = 0.1 ϕK = ϕL = 0 adjust to B
Preference and technology
γ, risk aversion 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
(2.2, 3.3) (2.2, 3.3) (2.2, 3.3) (2.2, 3.3) (2.2, 3.3)
κ, inverse Frisch labor elast. 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
(1.4, 3) (1.3, 3) (1.4, 3) (1.3, 3) (1.4, 3)
µ, fraction of non-Ricar. households 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.2
(0.099, 0.27) (0.1, 0.28) (0.1, 0.28) (0.1, 0.28) (0.11, 0.3)
Frictions
ωw, wage stickiness 0.69 0.69 0.7 0.7 0.69
(0.59, 0.79) (0.59, 0.79) (0.59, 0.79) (0.59, 0.79) (0.59,0.79)
ωp, price stickiness 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82
(0.75, 0.88) (0.74, 0.88) (0.75, 0.88) (0.74, 0.88) (0.74, 0.87)
ψ, capital utilization 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.39
(0.22, 0.55) (0.23, 0.55) (0.22, 0.54) (0.22, 0.55) (0.24, 0.55)
f, investment adj. cost 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4
(5.2, 9.6) (5.2, 9.5) (5.2, 9.6) (5.2, 9.6) (5.2, 9.6)
χ
w, wage partial indexation 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38
(0.19, 0.62) (0.19, 0.62) (0.18, 0.61) (0.18, 0.62) (0.19, 0.62)
χ
p, price partial indexation 0.31 0.32 0.3 0.3 0.29
(0.13, 0.54) (0.13, 0.55) (0.13, 0.54) (0.13, 0.53) (0.13, 0.53)
Fiscal policy
γGC, govt consumption resp to debt 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 -
(0.0051, 0.33) (0.0045, 0.32) (0.0074, 0.32) (0.0034, 0.32)
γGI, govt investment resp to debt 0.0033 -0.0031 0.0075 0.0006 -
(-0.11, 0.14) (-0.12, 0.13) (-0.11, 0.16) (-0.11, 0.14)
γK, capital tax resp to debt 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 -
(0.028, 0.32) (0.03, 0.32) (0.027, 0.32) (0.017, 0.31)
γL, labor tax resp to debt 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 -
(0.021, 0.3) (0.023, 0.3) (0.022, 0.3) (0.02, 0.3)
γZ, transfers resp to debt 0.074 0.075 0.07 0.069 0.2
(-0.02, 0.18) (-0.02, 0.18) (-0.02, 0.18) (-0.02, 0.18) (0.15, 0.38)
ϕK, capital resp. to output 0.78 0.78 0.73 - 0.71
(0.3, 1.4) (0.3, 1.4) (0.3, 1.4) (0.29, 1.4)
ϕL, labor resp. to output 0.43 0.43 0.4 - 0.38
(0.15, 0.83) (0.15, 0.83) (0.15, 0.82) (0.14, 0.81)
Monetary policy
φπ, interest rate resp. to inﬂation 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
(1.6, 2.3) (1.6, 2.3) (1.6, 2.2) (1.6, 2.3) (1.6, 2.3)
φy, interest rate resp. to output 0.095 0.093 0.095 0.094 0.093
(0.048, 0.15) (0.047, 0.15) (0.051, 0.15) (0.05, 0.15) (0.048, 0.15)
ρr, lagged interest rate resp. 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
(0.83, 0.89) (0.83, 0.89) (0.83, 0.89) (0.83, 0.89) (0.83, 0.89)
model comparison
log marginal data density -63.45 -63.65 -63.30 -64.17 -66.44
Bayes Factor rel. to benchmark 1 exp[0.2] exp[-0.15] exp[0.72] exp[2.99]WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 26
Table 4. Reduced-form regressions from simulated data using the
mean posterior parameter estimates. Estimates are for β1 from the OLS
regression xt = β0 + β1ˆ sb
t + ǫt, where xt is either the one-period real interest
rate ˆ rt or the ten-year real interest rate ˆ r10
t . The table reports the mean and
90% interval (in parenthesis) from 500 simulated data series from the posterior
mean.
Dependent All GC τL Monetary
variable shocks shocks shocks shocks
ˆ rt -0.0005 0.0008 0.0 0.0083
(-0.015, 0.012) (-0.0002, 0.002) (-0.0003, 0.0002) (-0.0053, 0.025)
ˆ r10
t -0.02 0.02 -0.006 0.02
(-0.21, 0.11) (-0.005, 0.04) (-0.009, -0.003) (-0.02, 0.07)
Table 5. Reduced-form regressions from the estimated historical in-
novations. Estimates are for β1 from the OLS regression xt = β0 +β1ˆ sb
t + ǫt,
where xt is either the one-period real interest rate ˆ rt or the ten-year real in-
terest rate ˆ r10
t . The table reports the mean and 90% interval (in parentheses)
from the posterior distribution of parameter estimates.
Dependent variable
ˆ rt ˆ r10
t
ˆ β1 0.0132 0.0269
(0.0113, 0.0151) (-0.0045, 0.0614)
Table 6. Robustness checks for the short- and long-run eﬀects of
expansionary ﬁscal policy on investment. The rows display impact and
cumulative present value (PV) multipliers for investment following various
shocks. PV multiplier calculations are described in footnote 12.
Investment Multipliers
Benchmark Varying αG No Output γ = 1,
αG = 0.05 αG = 0.001 αG = 0.1 Responses κ = 1
GC ↑
PV -0.69 -0.68 -0.68 -0.67 -0.52
impact -0.066 -0.066 -0.066 -0.064 -0.053
GI ↑
PV 0.84 -0.34 6.58 3.48 2.6
impact -0.011 -0.029 0.084 0.032 0.024
τK ↓
PV -0.42 -0.43 -0.42 -0.44 -0.45
impact -0.073 -0.074 -0.074 -0.077 -0.055
τL ↓
PV 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.29
impact 0.0097 0.0096 0.0091 0.0091 0.007
τC ↓
PV 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.42
impact -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.015
Z ↑
PV -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.32
impact -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.014WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 27










































Figure 1. Historical variance decomposition for model-implied fed-
eral debt and primary deﬁcits. Top row: breakdown by ﬁscal, monetary,
and all other shocks; bottom row: breakdown among ﬁscal shocks. The main
four ﬁscal shocks are government consumption, capital tax, labor tax, and
transfers shocks, in the order of the darkest to lightest shade. Units for the
y-axis are percentage deviation from the steady-state path.





























































































Figure 2. Impulse responses for policy shocks of one standard devi-
ation. Solid lines: estimated mean responses; dotted-dashed lines: 90-percent
pointwise probability intervals; dashed lines: responses due to distortionary
ﬁscal ﬁnancing. The y-axis measures percentage deviation from the steady
state. The x-axis is in years after a shock.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 28
















































































































Figure 3. Impulse responses for policy shocks of one standard devi-
ation. Solid lines: estimated mean responses; dotted-dashed lines: 90-percent
pointwise probability intervals; dashed lines: responses due to distortionary
ﬁscal ﬁnancing. The y-axis measures percentage deviation from the steady































































































































Figure 4. Impulse responses under various response magnitudes to
inﬂation. Dashed lines: φπ = 1.05; solid lines: φπ = 1.70; dotted dashed
lines: φπ = 2.5. The y-axis is in percentage deviations from the steady state.
The x-axis measures years after a shock.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 30





































Figure 5. Counterfactual exercise: tax increase in the 1990s. Solid
lines: data (observed or model-implied) conditional on the estimated sequence
of all shocks; dashed lines: capital and labor tax shocks turned oﬀ; dotted
lines: ﬁscal expenditure shocks turned oﬀ; dotted-dashed lines: all ﬁscal policy


















































Figure 6. Counterfactual exercise: tax cuts in 2001 and 2002. Solid
lines: data (observed or model-implied) conditional on the estimated sequence
of all shocks; dashed lines: capital and labor tax shocks turned oﬀ; dotted-
dashed lines: monetary policy shock turned oﬀ.WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 32
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Appendix A. Data Description
Unless otherwise noted, the following data are from the National Income and Product
Accounts Tables released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. All data in levels are nominal
values. Nominal data are converted to real values by dividing by the GDP deﬂator for
personal consumption expenditures (Table 1.1.4, line 2).
Consumption. Consumption, C, is deﬁned as total personal consumption expenditures
(Table 1.1.5, line 2).
Investment. Investment, I, is deﬁned as gross private domestic investment (Table 1.1.5,
line 7). Note that we deﬁne real investment by dividing investment by the GDP deﬂator for
private investment (Table 1.1.4, line 7).
Consumption Tax Revenues. The consumption tax revenues, T c, include excise taxes
and customs duties (Table 3.2, lines 5 and 6).








s is state and local sales taxes (Table 3.3, line 12).
Capital and Labor Tax Rates. Following Jones (2002), ﬁrst the average personal




W + PRI/2 + CI
,
where IT is personal current tax revenues (Table 3.2, line 3),W is wage and salary accruals
(Table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietors’ income (Table 1.12, line 3), and CI is capital income.
Capital income is deﬁned as rental income (Table 1.12, line 12), corporate proﬁts (Table
1.12, line 13), interest income (Table 1.12 line 18), and PRI/2.
The average labor income tax rate is computed as:
τ
L =
τp(W + PRI/2) + CSI
EC + PRI/2
,
where CSI is contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.2, line 11) and EC







where CT is taxes on corporate income (Table 3.2, line 7) and PT is property taxes (Table
3.3, line 8).
Government Expenditure. Government expenditure, GC, is deﬁned as government
consumption expenditure (Table 3.2, line 20), government investment for defense (Table
3.9.5, line 13), and government net purchases of non-produced assets (Table 3.2, line 43),
minus government consumption of ﬁxed capital (Table 3.2, line 44).WHEN DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT CROWD OUT INVESTMENT? 37
Government Investment. Government investment, GI, is deﬁned as government in-
vestment for non-defense (Table 3.9.5, line 18).
Transfers. Transfers, TR, are deﬁned as net current transfers, net capital transfers, and
subsidies (Table 3.2, line 31), minus the tax residual. Net current transfers are deﬁned as
current transfer payments (Table 3.2, line 21) minus current transfer receipts (Table 3.2,
line 15). Net capital transfers are deﬁned as capital transfer payments (Table 3.2, line 42)
minus capital transfer receipts (Table 3.2, line 38). The tax residual is deﬁned as current
tax receipts (Table 3.2, line 2), contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.2, line
11), income receipts on assets (Table 3.2, line 12), and the current surplus of government
enterprises (Table 3.2, line 18), minus total tax revenue,T (consumption, labor, and capital
tax revenues).
Hours Worked. Hours worked are constructed from the following variables:
H: the index for nonfarm business, all persons, average weekly hours duration, 1992 =
100, seasonally adjusted (from the Department of Labor).
Emp: civilian employment for sixteen years and over, measured in thousands, season-
ally adjusted (from the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CE16OV).
The series is transformed into an index where 1992Q3 = 100.





Wage Rate. The wage rate is deﬁned as the index for hourly compensation for nonfarm
business, all persons, 1992 = 100, seasonally adjusted (from the U.S. Department of Labor).
Inﬂation. The gross inﬂation rate is deﬁned using the GDP deﬂator for personal con-
sumption expenditures (Table 1.1.4, line 2).
Interest Rate. The nominal interest rate is deﬁned as the average of daily ﬁgures of the
Federal Funds Rate (from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
Deﬁnitions of Observable Variables. The observable variable X is deﬁned by making








Popindex: index of Pop, constructed such that 1992Q3 = 1;
Pop: Civilian noninstitutional population in thousands, ages 16 years and over, sea-
sonally adjusted (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
x = consumption, investment, hours worked, government spending, government investment,
capital tax revenues, consumption tax revenues, labor tax revenues, and transfers. The real
wage rate is deﬁned in the same way, except that it is not divided by the total population.